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1. Executive Summary 
In March 2009, Business and Economic Research Limited ("BERL") published “Costs of 
Harmful Alcohol and Other Drug Use,” a report jointly commissioned by the Ministry of 
Health and ACC. BERL was asked to measure the costs of drug and alcohol abuse to 
New Zealand society, but not to evaluate specific interventions. BERL calculated annual 
social costs of alcohol and illicit drug consumption of $6.8 billion, including $4.8 billion 
in social costs from alcohol. The report was cited by Law Commission President Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer as evidence in support of greater regulation, gaining considerable media 
coverage. 
This paper reviews BERL’s report, finding it contains serious deficiencies.  For reasons 
of time, we focus exclusively on BERL’s tabulation of the costs of alcohol.  
Methodological errors account for approximately forty percent of BERL’s listed costs: 
double-counting of the costs of insurance and the costs of insured losses; counting as 
costs all of the alcohol consumed by harmful drinkers rather than just the portion 
harmfully consumed by those drinkers; incorrect use of multipliers; not accounting for 
cohort differences between serious alcoholics and the rest of the population in labour 
force characteristics; and, assuming an implausibly large reduction in crime in the 
absence of alcohol.  Three additional cornerstone assumptions further inflate costs.  First, 
for alcohol consumers BERL uses an epidemiological basis to define the threshold for 
economic harm. This definition is crossed after 1.8 pints of beer and is low enough to 
catch one New Zealand adult in six. All illicit drug consumption is assumed harmful. 
Second, BERL assumes all harmful alcohol and drug consumption is irrational. Irrational 
consumers are incapable of detecting private costs in excess of private benefits. To the 
extent those private costs exceed benefits, they are counted as social costs. Third, BERL 
assumes irrational consumers enjoy zero gross (not net) benefits, meaning all private 
costs are counted as social costs. The second and third assumptions are not justified – 
they are simply asserted by BERL. 
The effect of these assumptions on BERL’s cost estimate is profound. An analysis that 
would otherwise be confined to externalities is instead inflated by private costs. BERL 
counts as social costs the production costs of alcohol and drugs, output forgone by time 
away from work, reduced productivity at work, and even the value of forgone unpaid 
household production, among many other private costs. A correction of BERL’s method 
– necessarily approximate because of BERL’s poor citation, limited description of 
methods and refusal to provide any working – finds total costs are about half and external 
costs are less than ten percent of BERL’s headline figure. The BERL authors argue that 
costs of harmful alcohol use total $4,794 million.  Correction for methodological errors 
reduces costs by forty percent, to $2,955.1 million, of which policy-relevant net external 
costs amount to only $146.3 million, less than five percent of BERL’s headline $4.8 
billion figure for alcohol.  Of these, crime costs account for 63%, health care costs for 
18%, and road crash costs for 11%. 
Many other weaknesses in BERL’s analysis are documented. The economic literature on 
alcohol and drug use contains a number of results which confound BERL’s assumptions: 
addiction has been found to have rational foundations; alcohol and drug abuse tends to be 
a symptom of other problems; moderate drinkers, many consuming quantities above the 
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lower bound of BERL’s harmful range, earn more and live longer; alcohol saves many 
more lives than it takes and has health benefits well beyond the point where BERL says 
harm starts and all benefits stop. Any policy based on analysis that ignores these benefits, 
as BERL’s study of harm necessarily does, carries the obvious risk of doing more harm 
than good. BERL's report also frequently misleads: for example its executive summary 
twice confuses a study of costs with an analysis of welfare. As is correctly noted by 
BERL at page 70, policy analysis requires an assessment of costs and benefits, yet the 
analysis does not reflect this fundamental requirement. 
The credibility and independence of BERL’s work is also questionable, further limiting 
its usefulness. The analysis ignores most of the large body of peer-reviewed economic 
literature in favour of a few (mostly commissioned) reports by a very small subset of 
health economists whose reports have been subject in that literature to many of the same 
criticisms leveled here. BERL’s report can be reasonably characterized as a New Zealand 
implementation of a methodology developed by Professors Collins and Lapsley, cited 
over 100 times in the BERL report. These same authors provided the external peer review 
of the report. 
It is customary in reviews like this to offer at least some praise, but BERL’s report has 
few redeeming features. Beneath its professional veneer, BERL’s report fails in multiple 
dimensions. Its conclusion is assumed. Its core assumptions defy both reason and the 
body of peer-reviewed literature. Its headline figures are overstated by an order of 
magnitude. The methodology is without foundation in the economics discipline, and the 
report has been peer-reviewed by the authors of its flawed methodology.  Its literature 
review is highly selective. The report contains elementary errors and misunderstandings 
of economics, and policymakers are likely to be misled by the report’s loose terminology 
and spurious comparisons1
2. The BERL Study 
. In sum, these flaws render the report of negligible use for 
subsequent policy-making. 
Our review proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the BERL study.  Section 3 
discusses specific problems with BERL’s methodology.  Section 4 assesses each cost 
item in turn and provides revised estimates for each cost item.  Section 5 notes other 
problems with the BERL report.  Section 6 concludes. This review is not commissioned 
work; it was neither requested or funded by any person or organization. Our interest is to 
see policy informed by robust analysis. We take no position on the complex question of 
whether more (or less) regulation of alcohol and illicit drugs can be justified on economic 
grounds; however, we suggest that policy aimed at reducing the external costs of alcohol 
use might be best addressed by examining first the areas where external costs weigh most 
heavily: notably, crime. 
In March 2009, Business and Economic Research Limited (“BERL”) published “Costs of 
harmful alcohol and other drug use” (BERL 2009). The study reported that the social 
                                                 
1Many of our criticisms also apply to BERL's (2008) report to the New Zealand Police on costs of harmful 
drug use  
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costs of harmful alcohol and drug use in New Zealand amounted to $6,881 million, 
including an estimated $4,794 million of diverted resources and lost welfare from alcohol 
and $1,427 million from drug use, with the remainder from joint harmful use of alcohol 
with other drugs.  The main components of the $4,794 million in purported costs of 
harmful alcohol use were intangible costs of premature mortality ($1,519.6 million), costs 
of output lost due to premature mortality, injury, or lost productivity ($1,478.4 million), 
the costs of producing harmfully used alcohol ($698.7 million), and costs of alcohol-
fuelled crime ($562.2 million). The estimates are derived using a counterfactual that 
assumes zero harmful drinking and no illicit drug use. 
The study was commissioned by the Ministry of Health and the Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) in the first half of 2008. The report's purpose was explained in the 
Ministry's Request For Tender (RFT): 2 
Accurately quantified costs will assist in evaluating arguments for and against 
government intervention pertaining to alcohol and other drug related harm. 
The RFT (p. 12) ruled out BERL assessing individual policies: 
…is not
The BERL cost estimation methodology has the following essential features. Only 
harmful drinking and drug consumption is considered. Harmful drinking is defined using 
an epidemiological threshold, which BERL sets at an average daily consumption of 40 
grams of alcohol for men and 20 grams for women.
 however, an evaluation of which interventions should be supported (their 
emphasis). 
3 To put this in every day terms, 40 
grams of alcohol is contained in 1.8 English pints of beer with 5% alcohol by volume.4
BERL estimates that their threshold catches 50% of all alcohol consumed in New 
Zealand and about 439,000 New Zealanders aged 20 and over. All illicit drug 
consumption is considered harmful.
 
That is, BERL defines harmful consumption to commence before a male has consumed 
two pints of beer on average per day, and before a female has consumed one.  We might 
then question why such an opaque measure of alcohol consumption rather than a 
transparent one was chosen: transformed into normal units of consumption, BERL’s 
standard seems rather austere. 
5 Both costs and benefits of non-harmful alcohol 
consumption are largely excluded from the analysis.6
                                                 
2 Ministry of Health (2008), p. 11. 
3 BERL (2009) fn 9 p. 7. 
4 The conversion from grams alcohol to pints is as follows. 568.26 ml of beer (1 English pint) with 5% 
alcohol by volume has 28.41 ml alcohol, or 22.31 grams alcohol given alcohol's specific weight of 0.78506 
grams/ml. 40 grams of alcohol is contained in 40/22.31 = 1.8 pints of 5% beer.  
5 Smoking is not considered in BERL (2009). 
6 All drink-driving accidents and deaths are counted by BERL as harmful drinking regardless of average 
daily consumption by the driver, and costs of all crimes where the criminal reports alcohol as having 
contributed at least somewhat to the offence are attributed to harmful use. 
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Under BERL’s methodology, the consequence of crossing the harmful consumption 
threshold is profound. Harmful drinkers and all consumers of illicit drugs are assumed to 
be irrational, and incapable of detecting the costs of private drinking and/or drug 
consumption exceeding the private benefits. At this point, BERL takes the most radical 
approach possible by assuming that irrational consumers of alcohol and drugs receive 
zero gross (not net) benefits from any of their consumption. That is, harmful consumers 
receive zero enjoyment, economic or health benefits from any of their consumption, 
including for the first 40 grams of alcohol (1.8 pints of 5% beer) consumed. All illicit 
drug consumption is assumed irrational and therefore free of any gross economic benefit. 
Without any private benefit to offset private costs, BERL considers all costs associated 
with irrational consumption, and many of the negative private and public consequences 
that flow from that consumption, as a social cost. BERL casts a wide net: social costs 
include all alcohol and drug production costs, excise taxes, customs costs, and even 
forgone production due to alcohol-related imprisonment as social costs. Without any 
offsetting benefits, the private and public costs counted by BERL for an activity as 
widespread as alcohol consumption are large. Consequently, BERL reports combined 
social costs of harmful alcohol and illicit drug consumption exceed the value of goods 
consumed by a factor of 10.7
The price of the BERL report, paid by the Ministry of Health and the ACC, was 
$135,500.
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3. BERL’s Methodology 
 
3.1. Three Fundamental Problems with the BERL Method 
Besides other errors detailed in Section 4, below, BERL's methodology for deriving the 
social costs of harmful drug use contains three highly questionable cornerstones: 
1. It uses a threshold for health costs to define a cutoff for economic costs 
2. It assumes anybody who drinks enough to cross an epidemiological threshold is 
irrational 
3. It assumes anyone who is irrational enjoys zero gross (not net) economic benefits 
from drinking 
BERL defines a threshold for harmful drinking based on epidemiological evidence. In 
itself, this presents no problem.9
                                                 
7 Value of goods excludes GST and excise taxes. 
8 Plus GST, we presume. Letter from Janice Wilson, Ministry of Health to R L Kerr, 21 May 2009. 
9 Note, however, that the selected cut-off point is contestable: a meta-analysis of studies of coronary heart 
disorders (Corrao et al. 2000) finds that alcohol has protective effects at consumption levels more than 
double the lower bound of BERL’s threshold for harmful consumption. 
 However, BERL uses that health threshold to define 
cutoff points for economic costs. Beyond this epidemiological threshold, BERL 
maintains net economic benefits turn negative. 
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Embodied in BERL’s approach is an assumption that the consumer’s utility function is 
limited to consideration only of health. According to BERL, non-health benefits from 
alcohol or drug consumption, like enjoyment or any economic benefits associated with 
drinking from social networking (see section 5.2.1) is not considered by a rational 
consumer. BERL really seems to believe this to be a realistic assumption: in three places 
in their report BERL considers the economic benefits of alcohol consumption, but 
consideration is limited to health benefits leaving the impression that is all they consider 
relevant.10
Empirical studies show the demand for alcohol has many factors, undermining BERL’s 
claim. For example, Mast, Benson and Rasmussen (1999) estimate a model of beer 
consumption that includes income, unemployment, local tourism, distance to nearest 
major brewery and religion types as explanatory variables, among other things.
 
11 Most 
variables were found to be significant. BERL’s claim is that economic benefits of 
drinking turn negative at the point of epidemiological harm. But because demand is 
affected by factors other than (perceived) health effects, the relationship postulated by 
BERL cannot be generally true. A rational, fully informed individual with a utility 
function influenced by anything other than their health may weigh costs and benefits and 
decide another drink is worth the cost or, if a religiously motivated teetotaler, that the 
first drink or two are not worth the benefits.12
BERL then makes the key assumption of its methodology: every consumer of illicit drugs 
and anybody who drinks enough alcohol on average to cross an epidemiological 
threshold is irrational, that is, they are incapable of weighing the private costs and 
benefits of their alcohol or drug consumption.
 
The effect of BERL’s use of a health threshold to determine the cutoff point for economic 
benefits is to set a low threshold that catches a large number of adults, around one New 
Zealand adult in six, substantially magnifying BERL’s headline economic costs. 
13
The irrationality assumption has two effects which when combined are responsible for 
the great majority of BERL’s multi-billion dollar headline annual costs. First, irrationality 
allows BERL to count private costs as social costs, at least to the extent that private 
benefits fall short of private costs. BERL's reasoning is as follows. While externalities are 
usually considered relevant to the analysis of public policy, private costs and benefits are 
not because it is assumed costs voluntarily borne are justified by some (perhaps unseen) 
private benefit. BERL uses irrationality to break this rule: if private costs are not being 
offset by private benefits then they may be counted as a social cost and are of interest to 
 
                                                 
10 BERL considers the benefits of alcohol and illicit drugs on pages 8-9, 29-30 and 93 of their report. In 
each case, the only potential benefits considered (and rejected) are health effects. 
11 Concern for health effects is not among the variables estimated. 
12 It would be rather interesting to tabulate the social costs (using a BERL-inspired methodology) of 
insufficient drinking by those for whom moving from zero consumption to one or two drinks per day would 
confer health benefits.  We would not, however, presume to suggest that policy ought be used to dissuade 
their forbearance. 
13 In section 3.3 we show that empirical evidence supports rational decisionmaking even for addicted 
consumers. 
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policy makers. Private costs greatly exceed externalities even for alcohol and drug 
consumption, so irrationality has a substantial effect on headline costs. 
The second effect of BERL’s irrationality assumption is to give BERL the freedom to 
decide by how much the private benefits of harmful alcohol and drug consumption fall 
short of costs. Irrationality only says gross economic benefits are less than gross costs but 
not by how much. The difference between the two contributes to social cost. At one 
extreme, BERL could decide benefits are worth marginally less than costs, minimizing 
the contribution of private costs to social costs. 
However, what BERL did was assume the gross private benefits of harmful alcohol and 
drug consumption are zero. That is, harmful drinkers and drug users receive no 
enjoyment, health, economic or social benefits from their consumption at all. By 
assuming zero gross benefits, BERL is able to include all private costs in their estimate of 
social cost. This assumption accounts for approximately two thirds of the headline BERL 
estimate of social costs. 
Astonishingly, BERL offers no justification for these cornerstone assumptions. In section 
4 of this review, we show that the combined effect of these cornerstone assumptions, and 
other less serious assumptions, is to overstate social costs by a factor of more than 20. 
BERL has, in other words, assumed its answer. 
These represent our most serious concerns with the BERL methodology. The remainder 
of this review considers other aspects of the BERL report starting with BERL’s apparent 
confusion over it scope. 
3.2. Is This A Cost/Benefit Study? 
Policy analysis generally requires an assessment of both economic benefits and costs. 
BERL explains early in the report that theirs is not a cost/benefit analysis:14
                                                 
14 P. 10. 
 
This study takes a conventional approach for economic cost studies, which “do not 
attempt to fully consider the economic benefits of alcohol… and other drugs, and should 
not be confused with cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses” (Single et al, 2003: 14). 
BERL offers a number of justifications for not fully considering benefits: this approach is 
conventional (p. 10); social costs are the most relevant “as they determine the costs that 
an activity …imposes on the rest of a community” (p. 16); benefits are out of scope (p. 6, 
fn 52 p.45); there is an absence of "rigorous evidence" for certain types of benefits (p. 
29). Yet BERL does consider economic benefits throughout its report and generally, but 
not always, decides they are zero. For example: 
…health benefits due to drug use are explicitly excluded from the scope of the study. This 
is due to the absence of rigorous evidence for health benefits from the consumption of 
illegal drugs, and contentious studies regarding the health benefits of alcohol (p. 29) 
Any illegal drug use is assumed to be harmful, reflecting the absence of evidence for the 
non-medical health benefits from the consumption of illegal drugs (p. 93). 
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We assume that it is irrational to drink alcohol to a harmful level and that harmful 
alcohol use has zero private benefit. (p. 173) 
Expenditure on alcohol used in a harmful fashion, including these later taxes, is arguably 
not matched by an equivalent private benefit (fn 107, p. 105) 
all illegal drug use is assumed to be harmful and consequently has no private benefit (p. 
173) 
BERL does count benefits in places, for example in the form of reduced consumption15
Part of the confusion over whether BERL's report is a cost benefit analysis also stems 
from references in the report to welfare effects and "total impacts". There are two 
references to welfare effects in the executive summary of the report giving the impression 
that both costs and benefits have been properly considered by BERL (see section 
 
(p. 36), avoided use of healthcare (p.10) and avoided unemployment social welfare 
payments (p. 54) due to alcohol and drug-caused mortality.  BERL treads a fine line in 
counting some benefits but ignoring others. Their challenge in taking a cost-only 
approach is to decide at what point benefits become so obviously inseparable from costs 
that benefits are most reasonably (less-embarrassingly?) left in the analysis. The trade-
offs in that decision highlight the anomalies that can arise in a cost-only methodology.  
As discussed in Section 4, below, many of these figures have required extensive revision.  
For example, while reduced consumption by those enjoying premature mortality may 
count as an external benefit to others, it should also count as an internal cost to the 
prematurely deceased. 
5.1.1), 
and may explain the Law Commission's confusion in using the BERL report’s “dramatic 
findings” to argue for policy changes – something to which the BERL methodology is 
manifestly ill-suited.16
                                                 
15 BERL counts lost production due to alcohol-related injury and mortality as a cost. It offsets this by 
deducting the value of forgone consumption, in effect counting lost consumption as a benefit of harmful 
alcohol use. 
 
Is BERL's study a cost/benefit analysis? Confusion over this question is to some extent 
unavoidable when one decides to count one side of the ledger extensively but the other 
only haphazardly. At times, the dividing line is unclear. But BERL takes a position on the 
benefits of harmful drinking: it is assumed they are zero because, it is said, harmful 
drinkers are irrational. Were BERL's brief extended to include benefits of harmful 
drinking, drinkers would, in BERL's world, still be irrational and therefore presumably 
enjoy zero gross economic benefit from drinking. Benefits elsewhere would come into 
the analysis and would have a significant effect. The BERL report is a study of costs not 
because BERL assumes benefits are out of scope but because BERL assumes in most 
cases benefits equal zero. 
16 See “The Law Commission’s Liquor Review: Address to New Zealand Police’s “Alcohol Related Harm” 
Breakfast,” 24 April 2009, p. 4. Available from www.lawcom.govt.nz. At p. 70, BERL says: "According to 
Collins et al (2006) avoidable cost estimates on their own do not indicate the rate of return a community 
gets from investing in alcohol misuse prevention and intervention over a period of time. A cost benefit 
analysis is required to produce this information." 
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3.3. Rational vs Irrational Consumption 
Irrationality is a central idea in the BERL methodology, fulfilling two roles. First, 
irrationality is used to explain why drinkers exceed the threshold for harmful drinking. 
Second, irrationality is used to justify ignoring all gross economic benefits of harmful 
drinking. We considered the second point in the previous section, and address the first 
point here. 
BERL's entire consideration of rationality is in the appendix of its report at page 173, and 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Non-harmful consumption is rational. For rational consumption private costs can 
be ignored because they can safely presumed to be offset by private benefits. The 
rational consumer consumes when benefits exceed costs; 
• Harmful alcohol and drug consumption is irrational.17
• Irrational consumption means the private cost of consumption exceeds the private 
benefit, and the difference between these values is counted as a social cost. 
 The source of irrationality 
is intoxication or dependence; and 
BERL is too quick to resort to irrationality to explain consumption in excess of a 
minimum health limit for at least two reasons. First, as noted in section 3.1, evidence 
strongly suggests non-health factors influence the demand for alcohol, meaning an 
epidemiological threshold is a poor proxy for economic harm and irrationality. Second, 
even addiction, a subset of harmful alcohol and drug consumption, can be explained in a 
rational economic framework. The seminal work is by 1992 Nobel laureate Gary Becker 
and Kevin Murphy (1988), who define addiction as: 
[A] good is addictive if and only if consumption of the good at different moments in time 
are complements. Moreover, the degree of addiction is stronger when the 
complementarity in consumption is greater. The link between addiction and 
complementarity implies that an anticipated increase in future prices of addictive goods 
lowers current consumption. These negative effects of anticipated future price changes on 
the present consumption of addictive goods are a major way to distinguish rational 
addiction or rational habit formation from myopic behavior (p. 689) 
BERL does not consider the Becker and Murphy model, but frequently cites a paper by 
Collins and Lapsley (2008a:10) that does.  Collins and Lapsley reject the Becker and 
Murphy model on the grounds that: 
The theory of rational addiction... does not merely demand rationality; it demands both 
rationality and full knowledge. Furthermore, it demands rational behaviour in a situation 
of full knowledge at the time at which the addiction was acquired. A high proportion of 
addictions are acquired in the early- or mid-teens when it would seem that the presence 
of both rationality and full information is unlikely. 
                                                 
17 BERL uses softer wording: "In the case of harmful drug [i.e. alcohol and illicit drug] use, however, 
individual decisions are not necessarily made on a rational basis…" (p. 173). The upshot of this discussion 
is that all harmful alcohol and drug users are assumed irrational and none enjoy any gross economic benefit 
from consumption. 
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The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) 
empirically test the rational addiction theory of Becker and Murphy (1988) by searching 
for complementarity in current and future consumption of cigarettes when prices change. 
They test rational addiction against a myopic "irrational" model of consumer behaviour.  
The evidence favours the rational model of consumer behaviour: 
This paper tests the model of rational addiction by considering the response of cigarette 
consumption to a change in cigarette prices. We examine whether lower past and future 
prices for cigarettes raise current cigarette consumption. The empirical results tend to 
support the implication of addictive behavior that cross price effects are negative and 
that long run responses exceed short-run responses. We find that a 10 percent permanent 
increase in the price of cigarettes reduces current consumption by 4% in the short run 
and 7.5% in the long run. In contrast, a 10% increase in the price for only one period 
decreases consumption by only 3 percent. In addition, a one-period price increase of 10 
percent decreases consumption in the previous period by approximately 0.6 percent and 
decreases consumption in the subsequent period by 1.5 percent. 
Chaloupka (1991) uses microdata on cigarette consumption to test for Becker/Murphy 
rational addiction, rejecting the myopic model of addictive behavior in favour of rational 
addiction model. Baltagi and Griffin (2002) test for rational addiction in US liquor 
consumption, finding evidence in favour of rational addiction. These articles reference 
other studies also finding empirical support for the Becker-Murphy model. 
Additionally, Becker and Murphy (1988:687) cite evidence that smokers, including 
youths, are well-informed and respond rationally to the dangers of smoking: 
Ippolito, Murphy, and Sant (1979) estimate that 11 years after the first Surgeon 
General's report on smoking in 1964, per capita consumption of cigarettes and of tar and 
nicotine had been reduced by 34 percent and 45 percent, respectively. This evidence 
blatantly contradicts the view that the majority of smokers were myopic and would not 
respond to information about future consequences because they discounted the future 
heavily….The behavior of teenagers is persuasive evidence of forward-looking behavior 
by smokers. Teenagers are often said to be among the most impatient (see the 
questionnaire evidence in Davids and Falkoff 1973). If so, their propensity to smoke 
should be hardly affected by health consequences delayed for 20 or more years, although 
parental disapproval may have a big effect. Yet smoking rates of males between ages 21 
and 24 declined by over one-third from 1964 to 1975. 
On our reading, this passage and the other empirical evidence presented here 
categorically refute Collins and Lapsley's claims that consumers, and especially 
teenagers, are unlikely to have the information they require to respond, and contradict 
BERL's cornerstone assumption of irrationality. Evidence indicates the addicted respond 
rationally to incentives: that is, they are aware of and capable of weighing costs and 
benefits and responding in a way that is consistent with non-addicted people. 
Our claim is not that the rational addiction explanation is definitive; non-rational models 
of addiction also find support in the literature. Our point is that BERL is too quick to 
dismiss rational explanations for heavy and addictive use of alcohol and drugs. The 
question of whether harmful and addicted drinking and drug use has rational foundations 
is at the heart of the BERL methodology, yet BERL gives no indication they are even 
aware of this literature. If rationality is instead assumed, then private costs are at the 
margin matched by private benefits (with benefits exceeding or well-exceeding costs for 
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inframarginal consumers) and social costs are confined to externalities.  In that case, we 
would estimate consumer surplus from alcohol consumption using data on price elasticity 
of demand for different cohorts of drinkers and net these benefits from the total costs 
figure we report.  However, these benefits would remain internal to the drinkers and only 
net external costs should be of policy relevance. 
We take the middle ground by making the less restrictive assumption that private costs do 
not exceed private benefits by more than epsilon18
3.4. Avoidable Cost Assumption 
 for each harmful drinker: we do not 
attempt to estimate consumer surplus enjoyed by harmful drinkers whose consumption 
nevertheless leaves them better off in utility terms.  When only net external costs - 
policy-relevant costs - are considered, headline costs collapse to just $146 million or 3% 
of the headline figures reported by BERL. 
In the executive summary, BERL reports: 
Using estimates from international research, this study suggests that up to 50 percent 
($3,440 million) of the social costs of harmful drug use may be avoidable. 
This avoidable cost estimate has no substance for the following reasons. 
First, the 50% appears to be based solely on estimates by Collins and Lapsley (2008b:33) 
who look only at avoidable alcohol consumption and mortality, not illicit drugs or 
unemployment or injuries, and so on. Nearly all of the policies they consider are specific 
to alcohol, and illicit drugs are presently consumed in spite of an outright ban backed by 
severe penalties. Yet BERL applies these avoidable consumption and mortality estimates 
across the board.19
Third, our reading of the estimates by Collins and Lapsley (2008b) is that they grossly 
overstate the potential for reductions in harmful drinking, for four reasons.
 
Second, Collins and Lapsley estimate reductions of 40% to 49% yet BERL assumes 50% 
(why not 45%?). 
20 First, the set 
of policies considered by Collins and Lapsley to be capable of achieving these reductions 
compared with the status quo are generally policies already in place and face declining 
marginal returns.21
                                                 
18 Epsilon refers to some arbitrarily small amount. This suggestion is based on the view that BERL's 
irrationality implies only that gross benefits are less than gross costs by at least some small amount 
(epsilon); nothing in the methodology used by BERL implies gross benefits of irrational drinking must 
equal zero. 
19 BERL seems to acknowledge this point at p. 69. 
20 In their review of Collins and Lapsley (2008b), Access Economics (2008b:ii) agrees: "The methods and 
numbers selected to derive the conclusion that it would be possible to reduce the social costs of alcohol 
over time by about a half, have no valid evidence basis, in our view."  
 Second, even the most drastic government efforts to reduce alcohol 
21 The full set of policies considered by Collins and Lapsley are: alcohol taxation, bans on alcohol 
advertising, anti drink-driving measures, “brief interventions” (mostly advice and information provided to 
at-risk drinkers during consultation by a physician), greater regulation of access to alcohol, alcohol ignition 
locks, guidelines for low-risk drinking, standard drinks labeling, and “other interventions” such as school 
and workplace programs. Most or all of these interventions are in place already, and we doubt that even 
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consumption, for example US Prohibition, have been unable to sustain reductions in total 
consumption of alcohol by more than (roughly) 30-40%.22 Third, evidence indicates 
alcoholism is often symptomatic of other underlying problems,23 which limits the 
effectiveness of policies targeting alcohol alone. Fourth, population wide controls such as 
excise taxes are ineffective at reducing heavy drinking because response rates are highest 
among moderate drinkers.24  As Stringham (2009) puts it, “Raising taxes on alcohol to 
prevent problem drinking is akin to raising the price of gasoline to prevent people from 
speeding.”25
3.5. Conservative Where It Doesn’t Matter 
 
In any case, many of the interventions assessed by Collins and Lapsley use incentives to 
discourage consumption, incentives presumably undone by the irrationality of harmful 
drinkers assumed by BERL. BERL cannot have it both ways. 
BERL acknowledges the rough nature of their estimate at p. 69: 
We use a simple approach: we assume that 50 percent of costs are avoidable and apply 
this to our estimate of total costs… This should be treated as an upper limit of potential 
avoidable costs, and not an exact figure. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the enforcement costs of policies capable of 
reducing harmful drinking by up to 50% are missing from the avoidable costs analysis, a 
point also recognised by BERL (p. 70): 
Single et al (2003) notes that estimates of avoidable costs do not indicate how these cost 
reductions might be achieved or whether the social benefits that result from these 
programs exceed their social costs. 
What is the use of a rough estimate of avoidable costs that carries with it no policy 
guidance, no assessment of benefits required for policy analysis, and no consideration of 
enforcement costs? 
The word "conservative" appears frequently in the BERL report, but BERL is selective in 
its application. For example, BERL conservatively ignores the 1.6% of alcohol consumed 
in New Zealand produced in the home (p. 7) and ignores nursing costs caused by illicit 
drug use saying (for the latter) these costs were "excluded due to data limitations and in 
order to ensure a robust, but conservative, estimate." (p. 47) 
                                                                                                                                                 
major increases in all of these programs could achieve anything close to a 50% reduction in alcohol related 
costs. 
22 See Miron and Zweibel (1991). 
23 See the Kaiser study, discussed in section 5.2.4 and a list of co-morbidity factors in section 4.2. 
24 See for example Chaloupka and Wechsler (1996) and Kenkel (1996), cited in Mast et al (1999). 
25 We thank Stringham (2009, p. 4) for the beautiful analogy. 
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Leaving to one side for the moment that BERL may well have assigned the wrong sign to 
its estimate of nursing home costs26
3.4
, BERL more importantly abandons conservatism 
where the effects are greatest, most notably in its decision to assign zero gross economic 
benefits to irrational consumers of alcohol and drugs, the most extreme assumption 
possible, in selecting a ridiculously high multiplier for value added from labour (see 4.2, 
below), and in selecting an estimate for the share of harmful alcohol and drug costs that 
are avoidable that was beyond the upper bound of its sources (see section ). These 
estimates have effects for the headline figures in the billions of dollars. 
3.6. Sensitivity Analysis Where It Doesn’t Matter 
In the Appendix to their report, BERL conducts a sensitivity analysis to test the effect of 
settings on headline figures. BERL tests a series of variables, finds only limited variation, 
and concludes, "…the estimates of harmful AOD use in 2005/06 are robust". The most 
sensitive variable is mortality rates, with a 10 percent increase in mortality rates leading 
to a 3.3 percent increase in estimated total social costs. 
However, BERL does not test the effect of varying these important assumptions: 
• setting gross benefits to harmful drinkers to be more than zero; 
• setting the threshold for harmful drinking above 40 grams (1.8 pints of 5% beer); 
and 
• a counterfactual that is something other than zero harmful drinking and drug use. 
4. BERL Cost Analysis 
4.1. Overview of Main Cost Contributors 
We proceed now to our analysis of the costs attributed to the harmful consumption of 
alcohol in the BERL report. We find many serious problems in BERL’s methodology and 
suggest changes that, in our view, make the BERL estimates more reasonable. These 
adjustments indicate BERL's cost estimate for harmful alcohol consumption is grossly 
overstated. We estimate actual net external annual costs of $146.3 million, a 96.9% 
reduction from BERL's figure of $4.794 billion in total costs. The main driver of this 
change is our focus on net external costs rather than including costs borne privately by 
harmful drinkers themselves.  However, correcting only for errors other than inclusion of 
private costs reduces the BERL figure by a third. Again, we focus exclusively on the 
costs of alcohol alone for reasons of time; we expect that analysis of their costs of drug 
use would yield similar results. 
Table 5.1 on p. 56 of the BERL report lists the social costs of harmful alcohol and drug 
use in 2005/06.  We use this table to structure our discussion here: we take each cost item 
in turn and subject it to scrutiny.  In Table 1 below we compare BERL’s headline alcohol 
                                                 
26 Harmful users of drugs and alcohol may well enter nursing care at an earlier age; they will, however, 
spend fewer years in such care if they also enjoy premature mortality.  Net nursing home costs may be 
reduced rather than increased due to harmful alcohol and drug use. 
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costs to our corrected net external costs of alcohol use; details on the calculations follow 
in separate sections.27
Table 1: Net external costs of alcohol use
  In both BERL’s original calculation and in our adjustments, costs 
are calculated as the difference in total social costs between, firstly, a factual scenario in 
which harmful alcohol and drug consumption occurs as it did in the year 2005/6, and 
secondly a counterfactual scenario in which zero harmful alcohol and drug consumption 
occurs. 
We note that the value of our corrections is necessarily approximate. BERL’s report does 
not explain its calculations in full detail, its referencing and citation is poor, and BERL 
refused access to their background calculations.  By contrast, all of our working 
calculations are being released simultaneously with our report. 
28
 
 
BERL 
Corrected Net 
External 
Costs Difference 
Discussion 
Section 
Tangible Costs     
Labour Costs $1,478.4 $-126.729 -108.6%  4.2  (4.2.1-4.2.10) 
Drug production $698.7 $0.0 -100.0% 4.3 
Crime n.i.e $562.2 $409.8 -27.1% 4.4 
Health Care $290.1 $254.8 -12.2% 4.5 
Road Crashes $200.1 $33.2 -83.4% 4.6 
Excise taxes collected . $-516 . 4.7 
Tangible Costs ($ million) $3,229.5 $55.1  -98.3% 
     
Intangible Costs     
Loss of life $1,519.6 $67.2 -95.6% 4.8 
Lost quality of life $42.4 $24.0 -43.4% 4.8 
Intangible Costs ($ million) $1,562.0 $91.2  -94.2% 
Total Costs ($ million) $4,791.530 $146.3  -96.9%  
                                                 
27 Since BERL’s overstated figures on alcohol use are most likely to adversely affect policy formation, we 
here only work to correct those figures.  We expect costs of other drug use to be equally inflated but 
correcting BERL’s estimate on that dimension seems less currently important than preventing BERL’s 
mistaken accounting of alcohol costs from entering into the alcohol policy review process. 
28 Here and throughout, please refer to our accompanying spreadsheet tabulating our revisions.  The 
spreadsheet is available at http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/eric_crampton/Alcohol.xls  
Table 1 derives from the tab “Summary tables totals”. 
29 We find a net external benefit in this category.  We find total external paid and unpaid labour costs of 
$173 million more than offset by external benefits of consumption resources saved of $299.7 million.  See 
Table 2, below. 
30 Note: the total in the BERL column differs from BERL's reported total because BERL seems to count a 2 
million dollar cost item twice: Road crash related lost output (temporary disability) counts under labour 
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Each of these cost items is taken up in turn, below, in the order in which they appear in 
Table 1, above.  After preliminary discussion of the labour cost category in general, 
labour costs, the bulk of BERL’s tangible costs, are discussed in ten subsections 
corresponding to the order in which they appear in BERL’s Appendix Table 2 listing the 
subcategories of BERL’s calculated tangible costs.  We conclude by explaining why our 
corrected net external costs remain, in our view, an upper-bound estimate of net external 
costs. 
4.2. Labour costs 
Labour costs due to harmful alcohol use make up the bulk of BERL’s calculated tangible 
costs: $1,478.4 million, which reflects the value of output that would have been produced 
but for premature mortality, excess unemployment, absenteeism, reduced productivity 
among drug and alcohol users in the workforce, and reduced household production 
caused by premature death, sickness, and reduced productivity in the factual scenario as 
compared to the counterfactual of no harmful use.  BERL offsets these output losses by 
the benefit of consumption resources forgone: those suffering from premature death also 
fail to consume resources which then are available for consumption by others. 
The first step in BERL’s calculation is to compute the reduction in the population relative 
to the counterfactual scenario due to harmful alcohol and drug consumption. BERL 
imputes back to 1951 current mortality rates for alcohol and drug use, applying mortality 
adjustments to this additional population (someone who did not die in 1960 from a drug 
overdose may well have died of a normal heart attack in 1985, for example, and would 
not be in today’s workforce), and summing up those who did die of alcohol or drug 
related issues but likely would still be alive today absent alcohol-related premature death.  
BERL uses estimates from Collins and Lapsley to estimate the proportion of deaths 
within different ICD-10 codes31
                                                                                                                                                 
costs and is the difference between BERL's reported total costs of road crashes n.i.e. and the sum of that 
category's component parts. 
31 The International Standard Classification of Diseases and Health Related Problems, 10th revision. 
 attributable to drug and alcohol use.  They note that 
while Collins and Lapsley provide negative fractions for some ICD-10 codes, meaning 
that alcohol use reduces mortality in that group, their focus on harmful use suggests a 
zeroing out of these fractions. In other words, BERL assumes that whatever health 
benefits are provided by alcohol use in reducing these kinds of deaths disappear once 
usage increases into the harmful range.  This is a controversial claim. A metastudy by 
Corrao et al (2000), for example, finds that mortality risk from coronary disorder is 
declining through consumption levels well into BERL’s high risk range: protective effect 
continues through 31 grams per day for women (with net harmful effect only beginning at 
52 grams per day) and through 87 grams per day for men (with net harmful effect 
beginning at 114 grams per day).  BERL calculates that some 17,796 people would have 
been alive in 2005/6 but for premature mortality due to harmful use of drugs and alcohol.  
BERL then distributes this additional population among full-time, part-time, and not 
working status based on averages for their age and gender. 
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To calculate the value of lost output in the factual scenario, BERL multiplies the number 
of hours their additional population would have worked by the average wages of this 
cohort, controlling only for age and gender.32 BERL then multiplies wages forgone by 
1.87 to arrive at the value of output forgone in the factual scenario, citing figures showing 
that GDP per full time worker is 1.87 times wages per full time worker; BERL argues 
then that the absence of a worker due to the above-listed conditions costs 1.87 times that 
worker’s wages.  This multiplication only makes economic sense under very restrictive 
and unrealistic conditions: Specifically, if labour is fully employed, so that a forgone 
worker cannot be replaced, and if capital is a perfect complement to labour, so that the 
marginal product of capital is zero when the worker is absent, then one could argue for 
applying the 1.87 ratio.  Even in that case its use would be debatable: if the machine were 
absent, the product of the worker would similarly be zero - the sum of the marginal 
products is greater than one.33
Even assuming perfect complements and full employment in the counterfactual, it 
remains something of a judgment call whether all output should be tallied in favour of the 
worker. If we relax either assumption, the 1.87 multiplier is untenable.  The assumption 
adds about $800 million to BERL’s cost estimates, but BERL offers no justification for 
its presence; it is unclear that BERL recognizes the restrictiveness of the conditions 
required for the multiplier to be reasonable.  In effect, BERL is allocating the surplus of 
production to labour, leaving none to capital.
 As example, imagine a firm with one machine and one 
worker with neither replaceable and both critical for production.  The worker earns wages 
of $10 per period, the rental cost of the machine is $5 per period, and output per period is 
worth $18.70.  BERL would apply the 1.87 multiplier to the worker's wages, but we 
equivalently could apply a multiplier of 3.74 to the rental cost of the machine.  If either 
input disappears, there is no output.  We could say that the marginal product of each of 
the worker and the machine is $18.70, because both are critical; total output of both 
together remains only $18.70. 
34
                                                 
32 Of course, very heavy drinkers may differ from average characteristics even in the absence of drinking: 
risk factors for serious alcohol or drug use correlate with poor labour market conditions.  This is taken into 
account below. 
33 The application of a scaling factor based on economy-wide averages also raises significant concerns 
about the use of average vs marginal costs.  
  If there exist unemployed labour 
resources, another worker will take the absent worker's place and the only reasonable 
multiplier would reflect frictional costs of finding new staff.  If labour and capital are not 
perfect complements, then a firm with a missing worker could choose more capital-
intensive production methods; again, the only reasonable multiplier would reflect the 
marginal losses of moving to the slightly less preferred production method.  The 
conditions under which the assumptions justifying the 1.87 multiplier are justified seem 
least likely to hold in the parts of the labour market disproportionately staffed by those 
with serious alcohol or drug abuse problems: markets for lower skilled labour are less 
tight than those for more highly skilled labour, and such labour is more likely to be more 
easily substituted by more capital-intensive processes.  It is particularly odd to apply such 
a multiplier to the costs of excessive unemployment facing unemployed heavy drinkers 
34 We discuss this in section 5.1.3. 
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who, even in the absence of alcohol, are more likely to be drawn from the lower tail of 
the labour distribution.35
A more realistic approach is to use a multiplier that reflects the findings of empirical 
studies of the relationship between value added per worker and wages.  A multiplier in 
the order of 1.05-1.1
 BERL considers none of this in its report: the 1.87 multiplier is 
simply applied to wages and BERL moves on. 
36
We turn now to an important aspect of alcohol and drug use that is largely overlooked by 
BERL, which is co-morbidity effects. Research suggests that factors such as mental 
illness or other personality disorders tend to predispose individuals both to adverse labour 
market outcomes and to harmful use of drugs and alcohol. By ignoring this, BERL 
overestimates the mortality and lost output costs of alcohol and drugs. Kessler et al 
(1997) find that those with long term alcohol abuse or dependence not only have a high 
probability of also exhibiting another mental disorder but also that comorbid DSM-III-
R
 appears to represent a normal range for these estimates. To correct 
BERL’s estimate, we reduce all labour cost estimates to 59% (1.1/1.87) of BERL's stated 
levels.  We conservatively consider the “value added” component of 10% as being an 
external cost, noting that employers would attempt to internalise costs by applying a 
wage penalty to those expected to be higher cost due to alcoholism. To the extent they are 
successful, counting the full 10% markup on wages as external becomes excessive. 
37
                                                 
35 Heavy use of alcohol is highly correlated with other psychological disorders which hurt labour market 
performance: see below. 
36 See for example Wolf (2004:176) who cites empirical evidence from the World Bank on the relationship 
between value added per worker and wages. 
37 A standard listing of psychological conditions, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. 
 disorders tend to predate alcohol use disorders. Ross (1995) finds that more than half 
of those with an alcohol disorder have a lifetime comorbid psychiatric disorder. Among 
subcategories for which data is presented, alcohol abusers have rates of mood disorders 
and anxiety disorders 2.3 and 1.7 times that of non-abusers. While 9% of alcohol abusers 
report antisocial personality disorders, only 0.6% of non abusers report such disorders.  
The Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (2005) notes that those with bipolar disorder 
are eleven times more likely to engage in harmful drug or alcohol use than is the general 
population. Bowden (2005) notes that unemployment among those with bipolar disorder 
ranges around 60%.  Pirkola et al (2005) find 20% of Finish alcoholics have a comorbid 
depression, anxiety, or combined depression and anxiety disorder.  Lerner et al (2004) 
find that those with depression have unemployment outcomes six times higher than a 
control group and that the employed depressed experienced impaired job performance: 
lower productivity. Workers with major depression enjoyed median incomes 19% lower 
than those in the control group. All of these results suggest BERL’s naïve estimation 
approach, which ignores these correlated disorders, significantly overstates what 
elimination of harmful alcohol and drug use can achieve. 
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Table 2: Lost output due to harmful alcohol use 
 
                                                 
38 We here correct for BERL’s use of a 1.87 multiplier rather than a more accurate 1.1 multiplier and for other problems in BERL’s method unrelated to our 
assumption of co-morbid psychological disorders that would have reduced output in the counterfactual regardless of alcohol use.  The next column adds the 
adjustment for co-morbid psychological disorders, as discussed previously: we assume 20% of harmful drinkers have comorbid conditions predisposing them to 
higher unemployment and lower wages.  See tab “Appendix Table 2”, and supporting tabs “Workforce reduction” through “Consumption Resources Saved” of 
the spreadsheet at http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/eric_crampton/Alcohol.xls  
 
BERL's 
listed cost 
Corrected 
cost38
Corrected cost with 
correction for adverse 
prior conditions   
External cost: 
policy relevant 
costs 
Discussion 
section 
Market Labour      
Reduction in workforce 459.2 270.1 262.5 31.4 4.2.1 
Net excess unemployment 877.5 152.7 122.2 11.1 4.2.2 
Workplace losses due to absenteeism 36 21.2 16.9 1.5 4.2.3 
Workplace losses due to reduced productivity 33.9 19.9 16 1.5 4.2.4 
Losses due to injury n.i.e 126.9 139.6 139.6 34.3 4.2.5 
Total paid labour costs 1533.5 603.5 557.2 79.8  
Household Labour     4.2.6 
Premature death 53.7 53.7 53.7 0  
Sickness 1.7 1.7 1.7 0  
Reduced productivity 2.3 2.3 2.3 0  
Road crash related lost output 2 0.9 0.9 0.2 4.2.7 
Crime related lost output     4.2.8 
Victims of crime 156.9 92.3 92.3 92.3  
Prisoners 36 17 8 0.7  
Home detainees 0.7 0.3 0.2 0  
      
Total paid and unpaid labour costs 1786.8 771.7 716.3 173  
      
Less consumption resources saved -308.4 -308.40 -299.7 -299.7 4.2.9 
      
Total net labour costs 1478.4 463.3 416.6 -126.7 4.2.10 
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To correct for BERL’s overestimate, we follow Pirkola et al (2005) in assuming that 20% 
of our sample has comorbid depression that would continue to exist in the absence of 
alcohol consumption, that those in this group (Lerner et al, 2004) have unemployment 
rates six times average (27% rather than 4.5%), and those employed in this group have 
earnings 19% lower than average (Pirkola et al, 2005).  This approach underestimates the 
total effects of comorbid psychological conditions because it counts only one such 
condition; however, we cannot find sufficiently reliable data on other conditions; we also 
do not adjust for premature mortality due to underlying psychological conditions.  Our 
slight adjustment for prior conditions accounts for $55 million of the cost difference 
between our corrected costs and BERL’s listed costs; it accounts for almost none of the 
difference between our final external cost figure and BERL’s total costs figure as lost 
output is a cost internal to the drinker. 
A rough correction for cohort differences and for proper multiplier application reduces 
overall costs of lost output by more than two thirds, as detailed below: the difference 
between the first and third cost columns in Table 2, above.  More fundamentally, BERL’s 
costs of lost output rely on two further unwarranted assumptions.  First, and less 
importantly, BERL implicitly assumes full employment: in the alternative, unemployed 
workers take the place of those suffering premature alcohol-related mortality and only 
frictional costs are incurred: output is only lost in the interval until a replacement worker 
is hired.  Second, and more importantly, costs here incurred are internal to the individuals 
involved: the drinker bears the cost of his increased mortality risk, increased probability 
of unemployment, and reduced wages.39 Table 2  The final column in  lists that portion of 
each item’s costs which are truly external to the drinker himself.  Only external costs are 
of policy consequence if the government worries about efficiency considerations; costs 
borne by the drinker himself may be relevant if the government wishes to act 
paternalistically, but are not supported by economic analysis without strong assumption.  
We now take each labour cost component in turn. 
4.2.1. Labour costs of market output: reduction in workforce 
BERL takes as counterfactual that those currently engaging in harmful drug or alcohol 
use are otherwise identical to the general population; if a reasonable fraction of those 
whose harmful drug use results in death had pre-existing mental illnesses that would have 
adversely affected their labour force status absent such drug use, then the counterfactual 
greatly overestimates the costs of alcohol use, as noted above at 4.2. 
BERL uses median earnings per hour from the June 2006 quarter Income Survey and the 
number of hours worked from the 2004 Household Labour Force Survey.  We use the 
2006 Statistics New Zealand publication “Labour Market Statistics” for both, then scale 
total earnings to match those used by BERL.  BERL finds that, but for harmful drinking, 
the full time labour force would increase by 5476, part-time by 1461, and the sum of the 
unemployed and those not in the labour force by 7240.  We first separate from this total 
those who died in car accidents: 18% of each group.  Many, but not all, who die in drink-
driving related road accidents are either the car’s driver or other passengers.  Stringham 
(2009) cites American data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Association that 
                                                 
39 Save, of course, for mortality costs to external parties caused by drink-drivers; these costs are assigned to 
the external category, as discussed below. 
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83% of those killed in drink-driving accidents are persons within the vehicle.  We assume 
that those within the drink-driver’s vehicle share similar labour market characteristics 
with the drink driver while the 17% external to the vehicle have average labour force 
characteristics.  We then tally forgone earnings by harmful drinkers by assuming that 
80% of harmful drinkers have average labour force characteristics and earnings while the 
remaining 20% have adversely affected labour force characteristics as described above.  
Total forgone earnings are some $239 million.  We use a multiplier of 1.1 on forgone 
earnings rather than BERL’s preferred 1.87 to arrive at a total cost of $262.5 million. 
The majority of the costs of forgone earnings are internal costs rather than external.  Lost 
earnings by external victims of car accidents are counted as external costs, as is the ten 
percent “value added” multiplier applied to all earnings.  External policy-relevant costs 
total $31.4 million. 
4.2.2. Labour costs of market output: excess unemployment 
The second component of costs of lost output is workforce losses due to excess 
unemployment.  BERL cites Rayner et al (1984) as showing excess unemployment due to 
alcoholism as being 10%: they interpret Rayner as arguing that high risk drinkers enjoy 
an unemployment risk ten percentage points higher than average (the difference between 
4% and 14%).  However, what Rayner et al show is that our overall unemployment rate is 
10 percent higher than it otherwise would be: in other words, the difference between 4% 
and 4.4% unemployment.  92,000 individuals were unemployed in 2004; BERL says 
excess unemployment due to high risk drinking affected 27,200 full time and 3,900 part 
time workers.  They then argue that a full third of our unemployed were high risk alcohol 
drinkers who would have been employed but for alcohol use.  This is implausible.  We 
correct BERL’s figure by applying the 10% figure to the number of unemployed in 2004 
to arrive at excess unemployment of 9200.  We then reduce BERL’s listed costs 
proportionately before applying an adjustment, as described above, to account for that a 
fifth of that population would enjoy adverse labour market characteristics even absent 
alcohol use.  We apply the 1.1 multiplier rather than BERL’s preferred 1.87 to arrive at 
total costs of $122 million: $111.1 of which is internal to the drinker and $11.1 of which 
is external. 
We note that the literature on the labour market effects of alcohol consumption is 
ambiguous.  Dave and Kaestner (2002) find that alcohol use does not adversely affect 
labour market outcomes; section 5, below, details other confounding literature.  We take 
BERL’s argument as given that alcohol use has deleterious employment effects, but we 
caution that such findings are not uncontested. 
4.2.3. Labour costs of market output: absenteeism 
BERL counts workplace losses due to alcohol-related absenteeism as totaling $36 
million.  We adjust this figure downwards by applying the lower multiplier, bringing 
costs down to $21 million, and by adjusting for those with comorbid conditions would 
have had heightened absenteeism regardless of alcohol use, bringing total costs down to 
$17 million.  Lerner et al (2004) find those with major depression miss on average 1.9 
days of work per fortnight (as compared to 0.7 days for the control group) and have an 
average productivity loss score four times higher than that of the control group; again, 
those with major depression are more likely to become alcoholics.  BERL does not list 
 24 
the number of days per week harmful drinkers are deemed absent from work, referring 
the reader instead to Pidd et al 2008 who report average absenteeism levels for many 
different categories of drinkers.  It would be consistent with BERL’s method, though 
their actual method is unstated, to count the average days absent for hazardous (1.3 days 
per 12 months) and harmful (2.6 days per 12 months) drinkers.  Lerner (above) noted 
excess absenteeism rates from depression of 1.2 days per fortnight, or 31 days per year.  
If we continue to assume that a fifth of harmful alcohol users have underlying psychiatric 
disorders, absenteeism consistent with those disorders would swamp any alcohol-related 
absenteeism: Pidd et al do not control for such disorders. 
4.2.4. Labour costs of market output: reduced productivity 
BERL counts reduced productivity among harmful alcohol users as costing $33.9 million.  
We begin by adjusting this downwards to correct the multiplier, bringing costs to $20 
million.  BERL estimates that the top ten percent of high risk drinkers experience about 
3.93 days per year of reduced work performance, on average, and that productivity on 
those days is reduced by 25%.  Lerner (above) notes a non-absenteeism productivity loss 
among those with major depression of 7.5% as compared to a control group; we 
consequently would expect a quarter of high-risk drinkers to exhibit daily productivity 
losses of this magnitude.  BERL counts as productivity costs approximately one full day 
per year for high risk drinkers; 20% of this group would experience productivity losses 
equivalent to 18 days work based on underlying characteristics, swamping any effects of 
alcohol.  We consequently further reduce BERL’s estimate to $16 million. 
4.2.5. Labour costs due to injury not elsewhere included 
BERL elsewhere tallies the costs of alcohol-related injury; here, they add in the costs of 
reduced production due to alcohol-related injury.  These costs are discussed at p. 126 
rather than in sequence with other labour market costs.  We cannot determine from their 
discussion whether the standard 1.87 multiplier was applied, but it seems not to have 
been.  We consequently adjust upwards BERL’s listed costs from $126.9 million to 
$139.6 million.  Nothing in the BERL report allows us to determine the external and 
internal allocations of this cost item: some costs will be borne by alcohol users, and some 
by external parties.  We consequently follow data described earlier suggesting that 17% 
of drink-driving fatalities are borne by non-occupants of the drink driver’s car. 
BERL bases its estimate of this item on ACC payments to accident victims, which raises 
an interesting methodological point.  Any tallying of costs should include either the 
insurance costs or the amounts paid out: not both.  If we were, for example, tallying the 
costs of Hurricane Katrina in the US, we could either measure the total property damage 
caused by Katrina, or the costs to insurance companies of such damage; we would be 
double-counting if we were to include both.  Similarly, we can either count the 
administrative costs of ACC (which are factored into ACC premia), or we can count the 
realized payments; we cannot count both.  BERL counts both: insurance company 
administration appears later as a $132 million dollar cost item while property damage and 
ACC-compensated lost income appear as other costs.  We consequently later drop 
insurance administration as a cost item. 
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4.2.6. Labour costs of household output 
On this item, we take BERL’s costs as given and simply note that they are internal to the 
individual rather than external.  We assume that BERL has not applied its 1.87 value 
added multiplier to this figure; if it has, then actual costs are 59% of those listed.  
Application of productivity multipliers for underlying heterogeneity will have only 
second order effects on these totals.  We would note, however, that if harmful alcohol use 
causes net excess unemployment, it may increase the opportunity for provision of 
household output while reducing productivity in that sector.  The net effect of harmful 
drinking on household labour would then be ambiguous. 
4.2.7. Road crash related lost output (temporary disability) 
Table 2 lists costs of $2 million for this item.  However, the only discussion of this item, 
at p. 122, lists these costs as being $900,000.  If the $900,000 figure is correct, 
downwards adjustment for correct multiplier application reduces costs to $530,000; if the 
$2 million figure is correct, the adjusted cost would be $1.2 million.  We list adjusted 
costs of $900,000 as a rounded average of these figures.  Internal and external allocation 
of costs follow the previous assumptions about the proportion of road crash victims 
external to the vehicle. 
4.2.8. Crime-related lost output 
Crime related lost output of $195.6 million includes lost output of victims ($156.9 
million) and lost output of prisoners and home detainees ($36.7 million).  Lost output of 
crime victims is a plausible external cost of crime; lost output of prisoners seems a cost 
borne by the individual. 
BERL estimates the contribution of alcohol to offending by use of surveys of prisoners.  
In the survey, prisoners are asked whether alcohol contributed to their incarceration; 
BERL assumes that those answering “some”, “a lot”, or “all” to that question would not 
have committed the crime absent alcohol use.  It certainly is possible that harmful alcohol 
use can contribute to criminal offending.  But is it plausible that everyone answering 
“some” to this question would not have committed the offence?  We do not have access 
to BERL’s survey data and consequently assume equal thirds across the three response 
categories.  We then reduce BERL’s crime costs by a third across categories other than 
drink-driving: it is implausible that a large proportion of crimes where alcohol is listed as 
having contributed “some” to the offence would not have been committed in the absence 
of alcohol.  Overall crime costs are then reduced by 20%.40
BERL estimates prisoners’ lost output by assuming that prisoners share identical labour 
force characteristics to the averages for persons of same age and gender.  This of course 
manifestly overstates these costs if prisoners typically have worse labour market 
characteristics than those not in jails.  Giles and Le (2007) survey the literature and 
discuss results for a sample of Western Australian prisoners.  In short, those in prison 
(unsurprisingly) differ systematically from others prior to those prisoners’ current spell of 
incarceration.  In the Western Australian sample, prior to incarceration only 18% were 
 
                                                 
40 Please refer to tab “Prisoners’ Lost Output” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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employed in high skilled occupations; in a region with an employment rate of 93% for 
those in the labour force, only 44% of those in prison who were in the labour force four 
weeks prior to incarceration were then employed.  Other literature cited by Giles and Le 
suggests poorer physical and mental health, poorer education, and poorer employment 
histories.  Estimating prisoners’ lost output by applying wage figures adjusted only for 
age and gender severely biases results.  Again, without doing a rather extensive amount 
of unpaid data work, it would be difficult to precisely quantify effects; following Giles 
and Le’s figures on relative employment rates, we deem prisoner output to be likely to be 
47% of those not incarcerated.  Correcting the multiplier and reducing the proportion of 
crimes fully attributable to alcohol, as described above, brings costs down from $36.7 
million to $17 million; correcting for individual heterogeneity brings it down further to 
$8 million. 
The above figure remains an overestimate of the costs of forgone prisoner labour if the 
value of work performed by prisoners in prisons is not included.  BERL does not include 
this figure, arguing that prisons only pay prisoners trivial amounts ($1 per day) not worth 
considering.  That prisons effectively offer slave labour rates is not an argument against 
considering the value of the slaves’ work; however, without a market wage, we cannot 
calculate the value of prisoners’ labour.  BERL notes that, at the $1 per day rate, if all 
3,553 alcohol-and-drug-attributable prisoners worked every standard working day, their 
pay would total only $817,000.  Of course, the value of work performed under duress 
need not approximate wages paid.  If prisoners’ work were worth $50 per day, this figure 
would of course be fifty times higher: $40 million.  We would then need to adjust that 
figure downwards for the fact that BERL overestimates the fraction of crimes for which 
alcohol was a necessary contributor: $32 million.  Prison labour would need to be worth 
only about $12 per day for the value of prison labour to swamp the costs of lost prisoner 
output. 
We adjust downwards the value of lost output from crime victims only to account for 
BERL’s 1.87 multiplier and for that fewer crimes are wholly attributable to alcohol than 
BERL assumes. 
4.2.9. Consumption resources saved 
BERL nets from its total paid and unpaid labour costs of harmful alcohol use 
consumption that would have occurred but for the premature death of drinkers, reducing 
its total costs from $1,786.8 million to $1,478.4 million.  BERL views this consumption 
forgone as a benefit for everyone else who then has more resources available to consume.  
While this is the case, it remains entirely a pecuniary externality: every dollar’s worth of 
benefits to others is matched by a dollar’s worth of costs to the drinker suffering from 
premature mortality.  We adjust the figure downwards to account for cohort 
heterogeneity as described above: if those suffering from premature mortality from 
harmful alcohol use had negative labour market characteristics, they similarly would 
enjoy proportionately less consumption as earnings would be lower.  We then add this 
figure as an internal cost equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the external benefit.  
We note that this may induce double-counting of costs if these losses are also included as 
intangible costs of premature mortality; however, we then wonder whether including both 
output forgone and an intangible measure of value of life would not similarly involve 
double counting.  If it does, our measures of costs here remain overstated. 
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As we will do many times in this analysis, we will here flag an item that should not be 
counted as an efficiency cost (or benefit) of harmful drinking as it constitutes only a 
pecuniary matter.  An alternate measure discounts all pecuniary externalities, both 
positive and negative; such an accounting is provided in 4.9, below. 
4.2.10. Total net labour costs 
BERL finds total net labour costs of $1,478.4 million.  Correcting for errors in BERL’s 
method, as described above, this figure reduces to $463.3 million.  Correcting further to 
isolate external costs, the figure reverses sign: we find external benefits of $126.7 
million: external benefits of consumption forgone outweigh external costs. 
4.3. Alcohol production costs 
BERL deems half of all alcohol sold in New Zealand to be harmfully consumed; they 
consequently list the value of that alcohol as a cost: a wasted real resource.  We note first 
that BERL seems to have calculated this value incorrectly.  As best we understand 
BERL’s method, any consumption less than 40 grams for men (20 grams for women) is 
left entirely to one side; however, the 40th
We first remove from BERL’s drug production costs excise taxes collected; alternatively, 
they could have been left in as an internal cost with a corresponding external benefit.  
However, we prefer to tabulate excise taxes on their own and so net them from the figure 
here presented and include them instead as a separate line item at 4.7.  We then correct 
BERL’s figure to account only for that proportion of alcohol consumed above the 
harmful drinking threshold by harmful drinkers.  We take the range midpoints reported 
by BERL for harmful and hazardous consumption and net out quantities below the 
harmful thresholds, adjusting for age and gender consumption patterns reported by 
BERL.  Netting out excise taxes and harmless consumption reduces BERL’s production 
costs by more than two-thirds: from $698.7 million to $215 million.  We note that all of 
these costs are internalized by the drinker: there is no external cost.
 gram of alcohol pushes the drinker into the 
harmful category.  At that point, all consumption is then counted as a cost, not just the 
portion of consumption above the threshold.  BERL’s counterfactual ought to bring these 
drinkers just below their gender-respective thresholds for harmful drinking, not to zero. 
41
4.4. Crime costs 
 
As was the case in adjusting BERL’s costs of income forgone due to excess 
imprisonment, we here adjust downwards costs to reflect a more realistic assessment of 
the proportion of crimes that would have been eliminated absent alcohol use.  Total costs 
reduce from $562.2 million to $409.8 million, all of which are external.  Details are 
provided in Table 3, below. 
We adjust police, court, community expenditure, and lost property costs using the same 
method as described in section 4.2.8, above. 
Costs of preventative expenditure require greater adjustment.  This item is nowhere 
explained by BERL.  A cursory footnote says it comprises expenditures on security 
                                                 
41 See tab “Diverted inputs” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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alarms, fencing, deadlocks and the like.  Presumably BERL has assumed costs on such 
things would go down proportionately with crime reduction due to elimination of harmful 
alcohol use.  BERL’s presumed assumption seems unlikely to hold.  Many of these 
expenditures are fixed costs, not marginal.  It is plausible that some individuals would 
choose to reduce the vigilance of their alarm companies were crime to decrease, but 
decreased preventative measures would be met by increased opportunistic property 
crime.  Expenditures on preventative measures would not decrease proportionately with a 
decrease in alcohol-related crime; furthermore, BERL cites no evidence that the elasticity 
of preventative expenditures with respect to crime rates is unitary.  With similar 
authority, we assert it to be 0.5: a 1% decrease in costs due to alcohol-related crime 
results in a 0.5% reduction in expenditures on crime prevention.  We first adjust costs 
downwards in the same way as other cost items in this category, then apply our asserted 
elasticity figure of 0.5. 
Table 3: Costs of Crime42
 
 
BERL's 
listed costs 
($ millions) 
Adjusted costs 
of crime 
($ millions) 
Customs 0.1 0.1 
Police 172.2 138.6 
Defence force 0 0 
Criminal courts 64.5 51.9 
Prisons 112.3 90.3 
Community sentences 18.7 15 
Preventative 
expenditure 61.3 24.7 
Property lost 133.1 89.2 
Total Crime n.i.e. 562.2 409.8 
4.5. Health costs 
We adjusted downwards BERL’s cost of treatment for victims of crime in line with 
previous reductions in the crime category, from $97.8 million to $78.7 million.  Other 
categories we do not adjust.  BERL’s listed primary medical care costs are not well 
documented.  GP visits for alcohol and other drug users are listed at p. 59 as totaling $52 
million, with other primary care services for the mixed group totaling $18.7 million.  In 
assessing internal and external costs, we assume that subsidies cover two thirds of the 
cost of GP visits for this category and that all other primary care services are publicly 
provided. 
As noted earlier, Corrao et al (2000) provide reasonable evidence of health benefits of 
alcohol consumption extending well beyond the hazardous threshold used by BERL; no 
health benefits are counted by BERL.  Net health care costs of “harmful” alcohol use will 
consequently be rather lower than those cited by BERL.  However, putting a value on this 
would require serious research beyond what we here are able to do.  We note also that 
while BERL assigns a value to the reduction in GP costs associated with alcohol-related 
premature mortality, they do not adequately consider changes in nursing home costs 
                                                 
42 See tab “Crime” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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which may be reduced more by premature alcohol-related mortality than augmented by 
earlier admission. 
External health care costs total $254.8 million.43
4.6. Road crashes not included elsewhere 
 
BERL discusses cost items in this category at pages 122 and 123.  Alcohol-related road 
crashes there are listed as causing $7.8 million in property damage.  Later tables list the 
cost as $21.7 million; we cannot explain the discrepancy.  Similarly, travel delays are 
listed at p. 123 as costing $8.6 million; the tables list the cost as $26.8.  Fire and 
emergency services are listed as costing $6.6. million at p. 123 but as costing $19.4 
million in the tables.  We take the average between the two figures in each case.  
Following NHSTA data cited by Stringham (2009), we apportion 83% of property 
damage as internal and 17% as external. 
More substantially, we adjust downwards BERL’s insurance administration costs to zero.  
As previously discussed at 4.2.5, we cannot count both insurance costs and the costs of 
insurable damage if we wish to avoid double counting. 
Total costs for this category drop from $200.1 million to $45.5 million, of which only 
$33.2 million are external.44
4.7. Excise taxes 
 
We count all collected alcohol excise taxes as an external benefit of harmful alcohol 
consumption matched by internal costs to drinkers themselves.  Alcohol is apportioned an 
excise tax because of the potential for external costs by excessive users.  Excise taxes on 
alcohol, as recognized in the Barker (2002) review of alcohol costs, will always 
overcharge those who impose few costs and undercharge those who impose many costs if 
those taxes on average cover the external costs imposed by heavy drinkers. 
BERL leaves these taxes out of their primary analysis.  Excise taxes form a part of 
BERL’s listed costs of diverted inputs, but the benefits of collected taxes show up only in 
BERL’s separate calculation of costs to government at p.130.  It is interesting to note that 
BERL counts only that portion of taxes paid on consumption above the harmful threshold 
when counting revenues that would be forgone if harmful alcohol consumption were 
eliminated but, when compiling the resource costs of harmful usage, counts all alcohol 
consumed by harmful users rather than only that portion above the threshold. 
Treatment of excise tax revenues is a rather difficult issue.  The government benefits 
from collected taxes while drinkers pay a corresponding cost.  The collected taxes then 
are a pecuniary externality rather than a technological externality: the benefits to 
government are matched by costs to those paying taxes.  The role of these kinds of fiscal 
externalities will be discussed below at 4.9.  We can either take the approach of 
discounting all fiscal externalities as being of zero efficiency consequence, as Browning 
(1999) would recommend; or, we can tabulate the relevant ones, along with our worries 
                                                 
43 See tab “Health” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
44 See tab “Road crashes n.i.e.” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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about their inclusion.  We follow the latter course.  It would be strictly wrong, however, 
to count only negative fiscal externalities while ignoring positive ones. 
We do not consider the excess burden imposed by alcohol taxes: the dead weight loss 
brought about by the tax wedge that separates marginal benefit from marginal cost.  The 
costs of the excess burden of taxation are properly viewed as a cost of tax policy rather 
than as a cost of harmful alcohol use.  We make note of the importance of and difficulties 
involved in this issue at section 4.9, below. 
Alcohol excise taxes amounted to $516 million in the 2005/06 fiscal year.  We count this 
full amount as a negative external cost (an external benefit) matched by internal costs to 
drinkers.  Taxes collected on harmfully consumed alcohol total $125.9 million; taxes 
collected on harmlessly consumed alcohol total $390.1 million.  The counterfactual we 
assume is that excise taxation would continue even if all harmful drinking were to cease.  
This also is the counterfactual employed by BERL in tabulating its version of the costs to 
government revenues were harmful alcohol consumption to cease.  An alternative 
approach would be to assume that excise taxation would cease if there were no harmful 
drinking.  If the point of excise taxes on alcohol is to offset costs generated by harmful 
drinkers, then the rationale for those taxes would disappear in the counterfactual.  In that 
case, we would deem the taxes paid on harmlessly consumed alcohol to be an external 
cost imposed upon harmless drinkers by harmful drinkers through the tax system: a 
negative fiscal externality.45
4.8. Intangible costs 
 
This category completes the assessment of net tangible costs.  Where BERL finds total 
tangible costs of $3,229.5 million, we find net external tangible costs of $55.1 million: 
about two percent of BERL’s figure. 
BERL tallies intangible costs from loss of life and lost quality of life.  For the most part, 
we have little objection to the value of statistical lives used or the method of assigning 
values to pain and suffering.  A better analysis would net from the costs of premature 
mortality those individuals whose lives were saved due to alcohol use: again, alcohol 
consumption even well into BERL’s harmful range can help prevent death from coronary 
heart disease (Corrao 2000).  These lives saved are no less valuable than are the lives lost 
through abuse of alcohol.  However, putting together a reasonable figure assessing the 
number of lives so-saved is beyond the scope of this analysis.  The only substantial 
downwards revision is the reduction we’ve implemented elsewhere: not all crimes 
counted by BERL would have been prevented in the absence of alcohol. 
Where we differ from BERL is on the apportionment of these costs between socially 
relevant external costs and costs internal to the individuals involved.  Loss of life or of 
quality of life due to crime or road crashes affecting external parties are obviously 
external costs of alcohol use and correctly count as policy-relevant; premature death 
caused by one’s own excessive use of alcohol is not an external cost of alcohol use.  We 
find that of the $1,550.5 million of adjusted total intangible costs, only $91.2 million 
                                                 
45 See tab “Excise taxes collected” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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truly counts as an external cost.46
4.9. Summary of costs and policy implications 
 The vast bulk of these intangible costs fall on the 
drinkers themselves and so are not relevant for policy purposes. 
Where BERL argues that alcohol imposes costs of some $4,791.5 million on society, we 
find that truly external social costs are only $662.3 million and are roughly matched by 
alcohol excise tax revenues of $516 million.  Net external social costs are then $146.3 
million: more than an order of magnitude lower than BERL’s figure. 
In order of importance, external costs are generated by crime, including medical 
treatment and lost output of crime victims ($605.9 million), health care ($176.1 million), 
lost output and loss of life for those killed or injured in car crashes by harmful drinkers 
($108.5 million) and lost value added from other forgone production ($71.5 million); 
from that total we net excise tax revenues of $516 million and forgone consumption of 
$299.7 million.  This suggests that dealing with the external costs of harmful alcohol use 
must begin by looking at mechanisms for reducing the costs of crimes for which alcohol 
was a contributing factor; it also suggests that net external costs are not all that great.  
Our finding is consistent with Barker (2002) who found that collected excise taxes in 
New Zealand at the time roughly approximated external costs of harmful alcohol use. 
An alternative way of dividing the external costs is between those best described as 
pecuniary and those best described as technological.  Economists distinguish between the 
two because only the latter has efficiency consequences.  We here rely on the definition 
provided by Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962): pecuniary externalities are ones where 
the effect is felt only through the budget constraint, while technological externalities 
enter the utility or production function directly.  Fiscal externalities are a form of 
pecuniary externality where the cost (or benefit) enters the budget constraint via the tax 
system (see Browning, 1999). Using this definition, the majority of external costs are 
pecuniary rather than technological: lost output, alcohol production costs, costs of crime 
prevention, health care costs, most road crash costs and excise taxes collected all count as 
pecuniary; intangible costs of loss of life and of lost quality of life enter directly into the 
utility function as would travel delays caused by road crashes.  By that measure, we 
would deem net efficiency-relevant external costs of alcohol use as being $108.9 million: 
the total of external intangible costs of loss of life and lost quality of life and tangible 
costs of traffic delays.  All other tangible monetized costs (and benefits) are pecuniary 
rather than technological as they affect external parties only through the budget 
constraint. 
It is perfectly reasonable to prefer a cost measure that includes both pecuniary and 
technological externalities rather than only technological externalities: if we care about 
total imposed net external costs rather than just those of efficiency relevance, the former 
measure is preferable.  However, if we count external pecuniary costs, we must also 
count external pecuniary benefits like collected tax revenues.  Whether we include 
pecuniary items or not, the two measures differ by less than $40 million; given the rather 
rough approach we’ve necessarily taken, we would not deem the values to be statistically 
                                                 
46 See tab “Appendix Table 3” of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
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significantly different from one another.  By either measure, policy-relevant costs are less 
than five percent of the costs reported by BERL. 
We do not take a policy advocacy role in this report; rather, we wish to point out that the 
analysis provided by BERL is wholly insufficient to form the basis for policy.  We would 
note that any proposal for increased alcohol taxes would need to deal seriously with 
issues raised in this section.  The bulk of the costs of any tax increase, including excess 
burden, will fall on alcohol consumed harmlessly.  We have nowhere tabulated the 
benefits to moderate drinkers of moderate drinking; the loss of such benefits would have 
to be accounted for in any recommendation for increased alcohol taxation. 
Moreover, any call for an increase in alcohol taxation would need to deal seriously with 
the issue of the excess burden of taxation.  Such an assessment would prove rather 
involved.  First, as excess burden measures the distortion in behaviour generated by the 
tax wedge, such a measure would be viewed as a benefit rather than as a cost when 
applied to harmful drinkers: the point of excise taxes is to reduce harmful consumption 
or, in other words, to induce an excess burden.  The excess burden imposed upon 
moderate drinkers would then be viewed as “collateral damage”, the costs of which 
would need to be netted from any calculated benefits.  Since the evidence suggests that 
moderate drinkers are more price sensitive than are heavy drinkers,47
5. Other Issues 
 the excess burden 
of any given tax increase will be larger for moderate drinkers than for heavy drinkers.  
Second, for marginal “harmless” drinkers, only the portion of the excess burden applying 
to their counterfactual consumption below the harmful threshold should count negatively.  
For those drinkers, a portion of the excess burden would be a benefit while the rest would 
prove a cost.  Finally, an assessment of excess burden would need to consider to what 
extent the measure of excess burden already counts health benefits forgone by moderate 
drinkers in reducing their drinking below the optimal level of drinking because of the tax.  
We would argue that, to the extent that there are external health costs of harmful 
drinking, there are also external health benefits of moderate drinking that would not be 
incorporated into the measure of excess burden. 
Simply pointing out that external costs are slightly higher than taxes raised is insufficient 
basis for an increase in alcohol taxes.  At the margin, an increase in taxes can do more 
harm than good by imposing costs on moderate drinkers that outweigh any purported 
benefits from reduced harmful drinking.  Without a thorough cost-benefit analysis that 
takes seriously benefits to moderate drinkers, we simply cannot conclude that a tax 
increase is an appropriate solution. 
The BERL report can be reasonably considered a New Zealand application of a 
methodology applied in Australia by Professor David Collins and Professor Helen 
Lapsley (2008a). BERL cites reports by these two authors over 100 times, far more than 
any other authors. BERL has publicly drawn attention to the external peer review of its 
                                                 
47 See footnote 24. 
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report apparently in an attempt to signal quality.48
                                                 
48 See the comments section of 
 Those external reviewers are 
Professors Collins and Lapsley. 
Both Collins and Lapsley (2008a) and (2008b) have been the subject of severe criticism 
by Australian consulting firm Access Economics in work commissioned by the National 
Alcohol Beverage Industry Council. In their review of Collins and Lapsley (2008a), 
Access Economics (2008a:iii-iv) concludes: 
Overall the report is poorly structured with inadequate cross-referencing, there is a 
paucity of supporting evidence and references for claims, the referencing is incomplete 
and there is a very serious lack of transparency in calculation processes. Methodology 
and data used are singularly poor. There is apparent upward bias in most of the cost 
estimates and uncertainty is not dealt with due to grossly inadequate sensitivity analysis. 
Using a best possible approach would exclude one cost item, making the overall cost of 
alcohol abuse at least 18% lower. The other findings of the report should be viewed with 
substantial scepticism. 
On Collins and Lapsley (2008b), Access Economics (2008b:i-iv) concludes: 
The most common approach… [is] cost benefit analysis (CBA) and cost effectiveness 
analysis (CEA). However, neither of these techniques is adopted in the report and, 
notably, the costs of the interventions are not estimated. To estimate gross benefits 
without estimating costs is likely to provide spurious conclusions – if costs outweigh 
benefits there may be no net benefit in any of the interventions reviewed. It is thus 
dubious how the information can assist in developing evidence-based strategies…There 
is no discussion of the literature review process…[c]ertainly the literature is much 
broader than the eight studies mentioned. Even then, only one study is used to provide 
evidence, with no good reason given for its use. Moreover, this particular study does not 
provide objective comparisons of interventions such as a league table of ICERs2 or 
benefit/cost (B/C) ratios (as would be expected), but instead provides a subjective 1/2/3-
star rating system. Included interventions have been tried historically with some degree 
of gross (not net) benefit, an approach likely to embed historical mistakes in future 
policy. 
Methods used to select so-called effective interventions are problematic and out of line 
with standard practice. Unreferenced claims are made that certain interventions are 
‘world best practice’, ‘proven-effective’, or ‘very cost-effective’, without evidence. 
Important issues are raised such as the treatment of combination policies and the risk 
that some policies will reduce benefits as well as costs of consumption – yet these are 
ignored, thus overstating the potential benefits of the selected interventions. 
In our view, there are fundamental flaws in the methods used in this Collins and Lapsley 
(2008b) report and hence in its recommendations. 
While that report was commissioned by the alcohol industry, our report is not. Access 
Economics’ criticisms of the reports by Collins and Lapsley parallel many of our 
criticisms of the BERL report. 
http://www.tvhe.co.nz/2009/04/27/alcohol-regulation-economists-would-
do-it-better/  The report’s lead author notes he was commenting in a personal capacity. 
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5.1. Economic Deficiencies of the BERL Report 
BERL claims that their study is of economic costs, but it is really a flawed accounting 
exercise. The economic literature on alcohol and drug consumption, its causes and social 
effects, and the effectiveness of various policy responses is extensive, published in the 
most prestigious economic journals, and largely ignored by BERL. Instead, BERL’s 
fifteen page literature review mostly draws of a limited number of commissioned reports 
written by a small group of health economists, most frequently Collins and Lapsley – the 
external reviewers of BERL’s report.  
The contrast in rigour between the published economic literature and the BERL report is 
stark. Our perusal of the economic literature on alcohol and drug use in preparing this 
review impressed on us the truly complex nature of alcohol and drug problems. Missing 
from BERL’s report are important ideas such as the complex relationship between 
alcohol and drug use, alcoholism as a symptom of deeper problems, the unintended 
consequences of regulation, the effectiveness of public policy and various subtleties and 
controversy in econometric modeling of those effects, theory and evidence for rational 
addiction, the drivers of demand for alcohol and drugs, the use of appropriate cost 
definitions, comorbidity between alcohol and drug use and psychological disorders and 
the extent to which alcohol or drug use can constitute self-medication for prior 
psychological disorders.  All of these ideas, missing from the BERL study, are of critical 
importance to policymakers concerned with designing effective policies. In what follows 
we highlight some particular economic deficiencies of the BERL report. 
5.1.1. Confusing Costs With Welfare 
BERL repeatedly claims their study of costs is a study of welfare, potentially creating 
confusion among readers. When costs and benefits are changing, as will generally be the 
case in the regulation of alcohol and drugs, changes in welfare cannot be reliably detected 
by reference to costs or benefits alone. The following examples suggest BERL is 
confused on this point: 
• “The focus of the study is on the harmful effects of drug use, that is, use that 
results in a net social cost. This reflects that society, as a whole, has fewer 
resources and less welfare than in the absence of harmful use.” – p.1 
• “Harmful alcohol use in 2005/06 cost New Zealand an estimated $4,794 million 
of diverted resources and lost welfare.” – p.1 
• “[costs-only] is likely to give an informative picture of the total impacts of 
harmful drug use” – p. 29 
• “We define harmful AOD use as use that results in a net social cost. That is, 
society as a whole has fewer resources and less welfare”49
                                                 
49 BERL’s quote is quite misleading. In referring to net social cost, BERL does not mean the difference 
between benefits and costs, as might be inferred from the reference in the next sentence to welfare, but 
costs net of small offsetting costs from, for example, higher mortality reducing later health costs. 
 – p.7 
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5.1.2. Mortality and Non-Paid Employment  
In fn 32 p. 34, BERL argues that early mortality deprives the country of people’s services 
in non-paid employment, saying this “reduce[s] a country’s capacity to support itself.”50
5.1.3. BERL Uses the Labour Theory of Value  
 
It is not the total welfare or total production which matters; rather, our well-being is 
judged on per capita measures. US citizens are not usually understood to feel 100 times 
better off because their nation’s GDP is that much greater than New Zealand’s. Since an 
early death changes both the top and bottom line of a per capita production measure, 
early mortality has a muted effect expressed per capita. If the consumption of non-paid 
services is deducted from the value of lost production, then we speculate the effect of 
early mortality on non-paid services is approximately zero. 
At page 35-36, BERL cites figures showing GDP per full time worker is 1.87 times 
wages per full time worker, and calculates forgone output lost from alcohol and drug 
consumption by multiplying forgone wages by 1.87.  This assumption adds 
approximately $800 million to the total cost estimate. 
BERL gives no indication it has considered the conditions in which this scaling might 
become appropriate. In scaling by 1.87, BERL is in effect allocating the surplus of all 
production to labour, leaving no surplus for capital. Students of economic history will 
recognize BERL’s (presumably) inadvertent reference to the labour theory of value,51 a 
theory discredited in part because of the restrictive and unrealistic conditions required for 
it to hold.52
A more realistic approach is to use a multiplier that reflects the findings of empirical 
studies of the relationship between value added per worker and wages. A multiplier in the 
order of 1.05-1.1 appears to represent a normal range for these estimates.
 
53
5.1.4. Externalities Borne Only by Business and Government 
 
At page 15, BERL reports: 
Single et al (2003) makes a distinction between private costs and costs borne by others 
such as businesses or governments. The report argues a key distinction is that private 
costs are those that are knowingly borne by an individual while social costs are not freely 
borne by the user or are borne by others such as businesses or government. 
This indicates to us a fundamental misunderstanding of what externalities are. 
Externalities can be imposed on private citizens and, conversely, costs to a business of 
                                                 
50 We note an earlier death also reduces demand for those non-paid services. We might speculate that the 
early death of a harmful drinker deprives the country of more consumption of these non-paid services than 
production. 
51 See chapter 1 of Marx (1867), "Capital: Volume One." 
52 See section 4.2 for more details on this. BERL’s multiplication makes sense only if labour in the 
counterfactual is fully employed, and labour and capital are perfect complements.  Only under these highly 
unrealistic assumptions, and ignoring cohort effects, does a worker lost from the labour force reduce GDP 
by 1.87 times their wage. 
53 See, for example, Wolf (2004:176). 
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employing an unproductive worker are not externalities. Perhaps this misunderstanding 
contributed to BERL’s decision to count private costs as social costs.  A basic staple of 
principles-level economics is that costs or benefits are not external if the agents are linked 
through a contractual nexus: the baby crying next to me on the long-haul flight does not 
impose an externality on me because I have chosen to buy a ticket that includes the risk 
of such unpleasantness and was accordingly charged less for that ticket.  Similarly, a 
worker who slacks off on the job or takes inordinate numbers of sick days does not 
impose externalities on his employer.  It is worrying that BERL does not seem to 
recognize this basic definitional issue.  
5.1.5. GDP is Not Usefully Compared With Costs 
BERL repeatedly makes spurious comparisons between cost estimates and GDP. For 
example (at page 1): 
Overall, harmful drug use in 2005/06 caused an estimated $6,881 million of social costs. 
This is equivalent to the GDP of New Zealand’s agricultural industry ($6,701 million) or 
finance industry ($6,982 million). 
Martin Wolf (2004:221) calls this sort of mistake an “elementary howler”. GDP is a 
value-added measure, but cost is not. From the comparison with GDP readers may draw 
the inference that $6.8 billion is the amount by which GDP is reduced due to harmful 
alcohol and drug use. It is not. 
5.1.6. Alcohol and Drug Users Share General Population Characteristics 
BERL assumes drug users have the same labour force characteristics as the general 
population (fn 36 p. 36). This assumption affects all of its net labour cost calculations, yet 
BERL offers no justification; correction for this reduces BERL’s costs by $78 million.  
5.2. Confounding Literature 
In the time available, we have only been able to review a fraction of the available 
literature on the costs and benefits of alcohol consumption. However, we have been able 
to uncover literature that directly contradicts many of the claims underpinning BERL’s 
cost estimates. In spite of their obvious relevance, none of the studies cited here are 
among BERL’s literature references. 
5.2.1. Drinkers Earn More 
Stringham and Peters (2006) report drinkers earn 10-14 percent more than otherwise 
equivalent non-drinkers, and that men who go to bars earn an additional 7 percent for a 
total wage premium of 17 percent more than an otherwise equivalent non-drinker who 
stays home. Stringham and Peters suggest social drinkers have bigger social networks so 
they are likely to find better jobs or perform better on the job. 
5.2.2. Drinkers Live Longer 
In a widely referenced meta-analysis, Corrao et al (2000) look at 51 studies considering 
the relationship between the level of alcohol consumption and death rate. That study 
associated the lowest risk of death with men who consume two drinks (20 grams of 
alcohol) per day; women experienced maximal protective effects at one drink (10 grams 
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alcohol). Although benefits declined beyond those points, they remained positive 
(compared to no drinking) for a long range, with significantly harmful effects beginning 
only at five drinks per day (52 grams) for women and 11 drinks per day (114 grams) for 
men.  This suggests a threshold for harmful usage somewhat above the “less than two 
pints for men” standard used by BERL. 
5.2.3. Drinkers Enjoy a Multiplier Effect on Education and Experience 
Stringham and Moore (2009) report on a recent analysis by Bray (2005) which found that 
drinking increased the benefits derived from both education and experience. While heavy 
drinking (six or more drinks on three or more occasions in the previous six months) 
somewhat reduced these positive returns, the benefit to moderate drinkers more than 
made up the difference. Bray concludes: 
Based on these results, alcohol use does not appear to adversely affect returns to 
education or work experience and therefore has no negative effect on the efficiency of 
education or experience in forming human capital. 
Similar to Stringham and Peters (2006), Bray suggests the formation of human capital is 
aided by the social interaction associated with moderate alcohol consumption. 
5.2.4. Alcoholism is a Symptom of Other Problems 
Stringham and Moore (2009) also discuss a study by Vincent (2004), which examined 
500,000 members of Kaiser Permanente health insurance in southern California. The 
study found that adverse childhood experiences including sexual abuse, missing parents, 
physical abuse, drug abusing parents and other incidents are highly correlated with 
alcohol abuse, tobacco use, drug abuse and obesity. Among members who never had an 
adverse childhood experience, defined above, only 3 percent of adults were alcoholics. 
However, adults with one adverse childhood experience had an alcoholism rate of 6%; 
10% among adults with two adverse childhood experiences, and 16% among those with 
four or more. Stringham and Moore (2009) report the Kaiser study is consistent with 
many other early childhood development research findings. 
To the extent that alcoholism is a symptom of other problems, BERL’s assumed value of 
50% avoidable costs may be optimistic. 
5.2.5. Alcohol Saves More Lives Than It Costs 
Collins and Lapsley (2008a:38) report alcohol, across all categories of consumption, 
saves more lives than it costs. Among low risk drinkers, Collins and Lapsley report an 
annual loss in Australia of 1505 lives, and 6,605 lives saved (compared with a 
counterfactual of complete abstinence). Across all drinking categories, Collins and 
Lapsley report a net saving of 2,300 lives per year.54
                                                 
54 Collins and Lapsley (2008a:38) state that “[o]f the total lives saved as a result of alcohol consumption, 88 
per cent occur at the age of 60 or above. 73 per cent of hospital bed days saved accrues to this age group.” 
No explanation is offered.  Note that we have not conducted an extensive review of the range of studies 
examining the extent of disease and injuries attributed to or prevented by alcohol; however, as BERL has 
zeroed out all possible positive health consequence of alcohol consumption, we feel confident in 
concluding that they have overestimated total health costs.  As noted in Section 4.5, above, we have not 
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This is evidence against the introduction of population wide controls against alcohol use, 
such as tax increases, as argued for by Sir Geoffrey Palmer. Any gains in reductions of 
harmful drinking will be more than offset by losses among moderate drinkers if the price 
elasticity of demand is higher for moderate drinkers than for hazardous drinkers (which 
appears to be true – see Sloan, Reilly, and Schenzler 1994; Chaloupka and Wechsler 
1996; Kenkel 1996, cited by Mast et al 1999). This warns strongly against the use of 
alcohol taxes to reduce net external costs of alcohol.  Rather, measures should be targeted 
at the segments actually producing negative externalities.  In particular, criminal activity 
is the largest generator of negative external effects.  When we hear reports of individuals 
convicted five or more times for drink-driving offences compounded by driving on a 
suspended license, we wonder whether efforts might not be more targeted at that small 
but highly costly group.  We do not raise the petrol tax to cut down on speeding; rather, 
we penalize speeding directly. 
5.2.6. Conclusion 
The empirical evidence presented here suggests alcohol consumption well beyond the 40 
gram threshold used by BERL is associated with significant, measurable gross economic 
benefits. These are additional to other benefits derived from health and enjoyment. 
5.3. Other Issues 
Our review of the BERL report was hampered by  poor citation. For example, we count 
56 references to Collins and Lapsley (2008) in the BERL report, yet the report’s 
References section lists two papers by Collins and Lapsley in 2008 and it is unclear 
which paper is being cited in each reference. References are generally listed without page 
numbers. A number of articles cited in the body text are missing from the report’s 
References section. Data in tables are generally presented with no references to specific 
tables in reports, and a number simply list “BERL” and “StatsNZ” as their sources, 
making replication impossible. Compounding these difficulties is BERL’s refusal to 
publicly release the working behind the numbers in their report. Our suggested 
adjustments to BERL’s estimates must be considered in view of these difficulties. 
BERL is frequently loose in its terminology. The term net social cost appears ten times in 
the report and BERL attaches more than one meaning to the term. On p. 10, net social 
cost is made distinct from gross social cost by noting that net means offsetting costs from 
early deaths are captured. Confusingly, however, on p. 39 net social cost is used to mean 
net of gross economic benefits, and at fn 15 on p. 10 “net harmful effects” means harms 
reduced by the presence of benefits. BERL uses the word ‘drug’ interchangeably to mean 
“alcohol and illicit drugs” and “illicit drugs only”. Meaning can usually but not always be 
inferred from context. 
                                                                                                                                                 
adjusted downwards BERL’s health costs because we have not been capable of quantifying the net effects 
within the confines of this critique. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
What are the uses for a study using BERL’s methodology? 
The time, effort and expense of preparing their report, BERL (2009) has achieved 
remarkably little. Given the decision to count costs but not benefits, BERL reports the 
unsurprising findings that alcohol and drugs cost a great deal of money to produce and 
that use assumed to be harmful is costly, but the extent of those costs is not reliably 
estimated. 
What, then, is the value of BERL’s study? On its own, the report cannot be relied upon 
by policymakers if the basic goal of policy is to improve the national welfare. If the goal 
is to minimize harm, the BERL report might possibly be useful, notwithstanding the large 
overstatement of costs by BERL identified in this review. But as BERL acknowledges in 
its report (at p. 70), policy analysis requires an assessment of both costs and benefits; and 
harm minimization is easily recognized as inappropriate for policymakers by the 
untenable policy positions that objective would recommend. As a call to action, the 
BERL study fails – it cannot even indicate whether more or less regulation of alcohol and 
illicit drugs is desirable, because that requires an assessment of benefits as well as costs.  
At most, policy makers will only derive meaningful direction from BERL (2009) if it can 
be paired with a corresponding study of benefits. Even then the BERL study would have 
only limited use: BERL’s decision to confine its analysis to the harmful use of alcohol, 
thus excluding (by its measure) half of all alcohol consumed, means a corresponding 
study of benefits will only be able to inform policies capable of targeting 50% of the 
consumption that is assumed by BERL to be harmful. BERL has little to say about costs 
or benefits of population-wide policies. 
Perhaps our most significant concern with the BERL report is its failure to warn readers 
about the methodology’s limitations, in particular to explain that without an assessment 
of benefits their multi-billion dollar cost estimates contain no basis for policy formation. 
Far from warning readers, BERL rather contrives to leave the impression that their report 
has policy value by twice confusing costs with welfare estimates in the report’s executive 
summary. Non-economists may be misled by these statements (and perhaps this is what 
led to incorrect citation of the costs reported by BERL in support of new regulations). In 
our view BERL has an ethical and professional responsibility to ensure that the report 
published in their name is not misused in such a manner. 
A year-long study commissioned by the Ministry of Health and the ACC at a cost of over 
$135,000 must surely have some purpose. We leave it to readers to consider what that 
purpose might be. 
 40 
7. References 
Access Economics (2008a), “Collins and Lapsley report review,” report for the National 
Alcohol Beverage Industry Council (28 November). 
Access Economics (2008b), “Collins and Lapsley report review,” report for the National 
Alcohol Beverage Industry Council (23 December). 
Baltagi, Badi H. and James M. Griffin (2002), “Rational addiction to alcohol: panel data 
analysis of liquor consumption,” Health Economics 11(6) pp. 485-91. 
Barker, Felicity, (2002), “Consumption Externalities and the Role of Government: The 
Case of Alcohol,” New Zealand Treasury Working Paper 02/25. 
Becker, Gary S. and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), “ A Theory of Rational Addiction,” 
Journal Of Political Economy 96(4), pp. 675-700. 
Becker, Gary S., Michael Grossman and Kevin M. Murphy (1994), “An Empirical 
Analysis of Cigarette Addiction,” American Economic Review 84(3), pp. 396-418.  
BERL (2008), “New Zealand Drug Harm Index,” Final report (April). 
BERL (2009), “Costs Of Harmful Alcohol And Other Drug Use,” Final Report (March).  
Bowden, Charles L. (2005), “Bipolar Disorder and Work Loss”, American Journal of 
Managed Care 11(3, supp), pp. S91-S94. 
Bray, J. (2005), “Alcohol Use, Human Capital and Wages,” Journal of Labor Economics, 
vol. 23, no. 2. 
Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen (1999), “Beer Taxation and 
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities,” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 66:2 (October), pp. 
214-249. 
Browning, Lester (1999), “The Myth of Fiscal Externalities,” Public Finance Review, 27, 
pp. 3-18. 
Buchanan, James M. and Wm. Craig Stubblebine (1962), “Externality,” Economica 
29(116), pp. 371-84. 
Chaloupka F. (1991), "Rational addictive behavior and cigarette smoking," Journal of 
Political Economy 99(4) pp. 722–742. 
Chaloupka, Frank J., and Henry Wechsler (1996), “Binge drinking in college: The impact 
of price, availability, and alcohol control policies,” Contemporary Economic Policy 
14:112-24. 
Collins D.J., Lapsley HM (2008a) The costs of tobacco, alcohol and illicit drug abuse to 
Australian Society in 2004/05, Report for the Department of Health and Ageing. 
 41 
Collins D.J., Lapsley HM (2008b) The avoidable costs of alcohol abuse in Australia and 
the potential benefits of effective policies to reduce the social costs of alcohol, Report for 
the Department of Health and Ageing. 
Conlin, Michael, Stacy Dickert-Conlin and John Pepper (2005), “The Effect of Alcohol 
Prohibition on Illicit-Drug-Related Crimes,” Journal of Law and Economics 48:1 (April), 
pp. 215-234. 
Corrao, G., Rubbiati, L., Bagnardi, V., Zambon, A. and Poikolainen, K. (2000), “Alcohol 
and Coronary Heart Disease: a Meta-Analysis,” Addiction, 95(10), 1505-1523. 
Dave, Dhaval and Robert Kaestner (2002), “Alcohol taxes and labor market outcomes,”  
Journal of Health Economics, 21, 357-71. 
Giles, Margaret and Anh T. Le (2007) “Prisoners’ Labour Market History and 
Aspirations: A Focus on Western Australia,” The Economic Record 82(260), pp. 31-45. 
Kenkel, Donald S. (1996), “New estimates of the optimal tax on alcohol,” Economic 
Inquiry 34 pp. 296-319. 
Kessler, RC, RM Crum, LA Warner, CB Nelson, J Schulenbery, and JC Anthony (1997), 
“Lifetime co-occurrence of DSM-III-R alcohol abuse and dependence with other 
psychiatric disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey,” Archives of General 
Psychiatry 54(4), pp. 313-21. 
Lerner, Debra, David Adler, Hong Chang, Leueen Lapitsky et al (2004), 
“Unemployment, Job Retention, and Productivity Loss Among Employees With 
Depression,” Psychiatric Services 55(12), pp. 1371-78. 
Lundborg, Peter (2002), "Young people and alcohol: an econometric analysis," 
Addiction. 97(12):1573-1582, December 2002. 
Marx, Karl H. (1867), Capital: Volume One: A Critique of Political Economy, Penguin 
Classics. 
Mast, Brent D., Bruce L. Benson and David W. Rasmussen (1999), “Beer Taxation and 
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities”, Southern Economic Journal 66(2), pp. 214-49. 
Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia, Inc. (2005), “Bipolar disorder and alcohol and 
drug use,” Mental Illness Fact Sheet Series.  Available at 
http://esvc000144.wic027u.server-
web.com/pdfs/Bipolar%20alcohol%20and%20drug%20use.pdf 
Ministry of Health (2008), “Tender For Alcohol And Other Drugs Cost Analysis,” 14 
March. 
Miron, Jeffrey A. and Jeffrey Zwiebel (1991), "Alcohol Consumption During 
Prohibition," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 242-247. 
 42 
Mishan, E.J. (1971), “Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 79:4, pp. 687-705. 
New Zealand Treasury (2005), Cost Benefit Analysis Primer v 1.2, Wellington. 
Palmer, Sir Geoffrey (2009), “The Law Commission’s Liquor Review: Address to New 
Zealand Police’s “Alcohol Related Harm” Breakfast,” 24 April. Available from 
www.lawcom.govt.nz. 
Pidd, Kenneth J., Jesia G. Berry, Ann M. Roche and James E. Harrison (2006), 
“Estimating the cost of alcohol-related absenteeism in the Australian workforce: the 
importance of consumption patterns,” Medical Journal of Australia 185(11/12), pp. 637-
41. 
Pirkola, Sami P., Erkki Isometsa et al. (2005), “DSM-IV mood-, anxiety-, and alcohol use 
disorders and their comorbidity in the Finnish general population,” Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 41(1), pp. 1-10. 
Rayner, T and T. Alexander (1984), “Costs of alcohol abuse in New Zealand – a 
preliminary study”, Report to ALAC. 
Ross, Helen E.  (1995), “DSM-III-R alcohol abuse and dependence and psychiatric 
comorbidity in Ontario: results from the Mental Health Supplement to the Ontario Health 
Survey,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 39, pp. 111-28. 
Sloan, Frank A., Bridget A. Reilly, and Christoph Schenzler (1994), "Tort liability versus 
other approaches for deterring careless driving," International Review of Law and 
Economics 14, pp. 53-71.  
Statistics New Zealand (2006), “Labour Market Statistics 2006,” available at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/FC56B1A7-FE92-4F78-A05C-
0FD95943778C/0/LabourMarketStatisticsfinalpdfversion.pdf 
Stringham, Edward P. and Adrian T. Moore (2009), “The Catastrophe of What Passes for 
Alcohol Policy Analysis,” Reason Foundation, Policy Brief No. 78 (12 May). 
Stringham, Edward P. and Bethany L. Peters (2006), “No Booze? You May Lose: Why 
Drinkers Earn More Money Than Nondrinkers,” Reason Foundation, September.  
Vincent, J. (2004), “The Origins of Addiction: Evidence from the Adverse Childhood 
Experiences Study,” Department of Preventative Medicine, Kaiser Permanente Medical 
Care Program, San Diego, California, 2004. 
Woodfield, Alan (1981), "Cost-benefit analysis of consumer policy: Framework and 
critique."  Paper presented at the Wharton Applied Research Center Conference 
"Analysis of Consumer Policy", Philadelphia, May 18-19.  
 
